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This paper inserts Veblen’s (1898) concepts of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous 
consumption into a very simple model. Individuals have the choice to either invest their 
time into working, leading to easily observable levels of consumption, or into 
conspicuous leisure, whose effect on utility depends on how observable leisure is. We let 
the visibility of leisure depend positively on the amount of time an individual and her 
neighbors have lived in the same area. Individuals optimize across conspicuous leisure 
and conspicuous consumption. If population turnover is high, individuals are made worse 
off, since the visibility of conspicuous leisure then decreases and the status race must be 
played out primarily via conspicuous consumption. Analyzing interstate mobility in the 
US, we find strong support for our hypothesis: a 1 percentage point rise in population 
turnover increases the average work week of non-migrants by 7 minutes. The negative 
externality of population turnover on the visibility of conspicuous leisure is an argument 
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  iiI. Introduction 
This paper builds on the classic arguments of Veblen (1898) concerning the way 
individuals play status games. In his book The Theory of the Leisure Class he 
distinguishes between the possibility to signal one’s worth either via conspicuous 
consumption consisting of the display of expensive consumer goods, or via the overt 
display of leisurely activities.  
Veblen saw conspicuous leisure everywhere. In his time, manual labor was heavily 
frowned upon by the nobility, and a truly wealthy man was a man of leisure. He saw it in 
the royal courts where kings signaled their wealth by their own idleness and that of a 
whole court of idle noblemen, who all had to be taken care off by others. He saw it in 
accounts of heavenly courts where an idle god was surrounded by idle angels. Veblen 
also saw it in the manners of people around him: he argued that the overt display of 
knowledge of etiquette, arts, defunct languages, and all other signals of ‘sophistication 
and civilization’ were essentially means of signaling the results of an abundance of 
leisure time.  
In the modern day, the idle courts are a distant echo, but conspicuous leisure is all around 
us. People who speak Latin, play the piano with aplomb, know a Matisse from a 
Modigliani, or can list the best years for a Bordeaux have invested considerable time in 
gaining a set of skills whose primary productive purpose is to impress others. By 
engaging in conspicuous leisure, these people have made a conscious trade-off. The 
alternative means of impressing one’s contemporaries is conspicuous consumption: 
working longer hours in order to purchase an expensive home, a flashy car, or the latest 
  1model television. In recent decades, there has been a clear decline in conspicuous leisure 
relative to conspicuous consumption. Explaining this change is the main task of this 
paper. 
Conspicuous consumption – which we equate with materialism – has been widely 
discussed in recent times. Early works by economists include Duesenberry (1949), Van 
Praag (1977), Layard (1980), Van der Stadt et al. (1985) and Frank (1985). These all 
refer to Veblen when they argue that the utility of one person falls as the incomes of 
those in her reference group rise. This prediction has been the subject of intense empirical 
debate within the happiness literature, with most finding evidence for “reference effects” 
(Clark and Oswald 1996, Knight and Song 2004; see also the surveys in Ferrer and 
Frijters 2004 and Layard 2003). The existence and optimal tax implications of 
conspicuous consumption has been a recent item of debate in the theory literature 
(Ireland 1998; Dupor and Liu 2003; Abel 2004; Samuelson 2004; Ljungqvist and Uhlig 
2000). So far as we are aware however, Veblen’s concept of conspicuous leisure has been 
absent from these debates, although Layard (1980) did call for models and applications 
with simultaneous status races.  
In a very simple model we give individuals the choice to divide their time into working, 
leading to easily observable levels of conspicuous consumption, or into conspicuous 
leisure. Extending Veblen’s arguments, we take the importance of conspicuous leisure to 
depend positively on the amount of time an individual and her neighbors have lived in the 
same area. The rationale for this is simple: whereas cars and houses are immediately 
observable for any new arrival in the neighborhood, it takes time to get to know the 
leisure activities of ones’ neighbors. In a situation of high population turnover, the ones 
  2indulging in conspicuous leisure are in great danger of being unnoticed. This argument 
sets our paper apart from Veblen and all papers mentioned above, which have either 
taken leisure’s effect on utility to be independent of visibility (and thus invariably argue 
that conspicuous consumption is welfare inefficient) or have taken social norms on 
leisure as important but exogenous to economic factors (such as Stutzer and Lalive 2004).  
We solve for the optimal time allocation path of the individual, which turns out to mean 
that an individual should over time increase the amount of time spent on leisure as his 
activities become wider known in the neighborhood. The optimal decision path for a 
neighborhood as a whole is that the ‘older neighborhoods’ should see relatively higher 
levels of conspicuous leisure.  
We test our theory on US data. As our measure of the length of time individuals stay 
somewhere, we use the fraction of the population that has moved into the state in the past 
year. As our measure of investments into conspicuous consumption we use three 
variables: hours per week, weeks per year, and hours per year. Controlling for age, race, 
gender, education, average hourly wages, average annual income, the unemployment 
rate, population size, the population growth rate, and including state and year fixed 
effects, we find a positive relation between population turnover and conspicuous 
consumption. This relationship is strongest when we exclude the migrants themselves 
from our specifications. Our theory of conspicuous leisure can thus explain why various 
measures of labor supply rise as population turnover increases. An alternative potential 
explanation would be that positive state productivity shocks drive both increased migrant 
flows and increased labor usage. The results do not fully support that alternative though: 
not only is the wage rate effect on conspicuous consumption in theory ambiguous, but the 
  3effect of positive productivity shocks should be captured in our controls for aggregate 
productivity. Also, the strongest effects on current labor supply are found using lagged 
migration rates, which should suffer less from contemporaneous unobserved productivity 
shocks. 
Our very simple theory would thus predict that countries with lower rates of population 
turnover (the EU) would be less materialistic than those with high turnover (the US). By 
arguing that mobility costs are still going down nearly everywhere for a variety of 
reasons, we get the overall prediction that world levels of materialism will increase. The 
policy implications are simple: there is a negative externality of moving elsewhere on the 
visibility of other people’s leisure, which gives an argument for taxes on mobility.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III 
presents the data and empirical analysis. The final Section concludes.  
II. The Model 
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  4Here   is the utility payoff of conspicuous consumption, which depends on the ratio of 
one’s own income (  where   is hours worked and   is the wage rate) to the 
average income in the neighborhood (
1 u
it i hw it h i w
t W );   is the payoff to conspicuous leisure, which 
depends on the ratio of own leisure (  to the average leisure enjoyed by others (
2 u
) it l ) t l ; T  
is the total amount of hours available for discretionary leisure or work, and  () t it f τ τ ,  is 
the ‘visibility’ function of leisure which depends positively on the amount of time the 
individual i has lived in the same neighborhood ( it τ ) and the amount of time others have 
lived in the neighborhood ( t τ ). The reason for the positive marginals on  f  is simple: the 
longer you have lived in a neighborhood, the more time others have had to observe your 
leisure decisions.
1 The longer other people have lived in the neighborhood, the easier it 
becomes for them to see the activities of other people; partly because they can allocate 
more time to newcomers and partly because they have increased knowledge of the 
possible range of leisure activities to look out for. The assumptions on functional form 
are standard: they ensure an interior solution but follow Gossen’s law of diminishing 
marginal utility to the two possible forms of consumption.  
                                                 
1 As an example of how a particular function f(.) could arise from a matching framework: interpret f(.) as 
the expected fraction of the individuals in the neighborhood who know a person’s leisure activities. 
Suppose that two random individuals from the same neighborhood meet each other with arrival rate λ. This 
meeting produces a contact that allows both to observe each other’s leisure. Suppose also that this 
information is shared with a fraction δ of the existing contacts of the person met. This means that the 
fraction of the neighborhood that gets informed of ones’ leisure activities at a single meeting is λ(1+ δR) 
where R is the expected number of contacts (‘relations’) of the other person at the meeting. This number R 
is an increasing function of  t τ . Taking the number of individuals in the neighborhood to be large and δR 
small, the probability that a random individual in the neighborhood does not know the leisure activities of 
person i after person i has been in the neighborhood for will then be 
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function of  t τ  and  it τ and fits all the assumptions made on f(.).  
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The interesting things about this solution are the comparative statics from the point of 
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dτ  gives the prediction that time spent on conspicuous leisure will increase 
as a person lives in the same neighborhood for longer whereas time spent on conspicuous 
consumption by earning income will decrease. The same holds when the population 
turnover rate for the neighborhood as a whole declines: time spent on conspicuous leisure 
will increase as neighbors live in the same neighborhood for longer whereas time spent 
on conspicuous consumption by earning income will decrease. Neighborhoods with 
lower rates of population turnover (high  t τ ) should thus see more involvement in leisure 
activities than neighborhoods with very high population turnover rates (low  t τ ).  




dw  reveal inconclusiveness (bearing in mind that the term 
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′′) would go the other way.  
As an extension to this, we can ask: what happens if the whole neighborhood and the 
individual stay longer and we take account of the effect of the community reaction on 
community wages? In other words, what happens when  it it dd τ τ =  and  t t i w W h = ? Then, 
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The initial positive feedback effect via  () f .  of lower population turnover rates 
( 11
22 () ()
t it tt tt it it ll f uf u τ τ ττ ττ
′′ ′′ ,+ ,) involves several offsetting effects: as average 
conspicuous leisure increases, the relative payoff to conspicuous consumption increases 







−  and the relative 
payoff to conspicuous leisure decreases because of increased aggregate leisure (reflected 




t it l f u τ τ
′′ ,.  These feedback effects only dampen the positive effect of 
greater longevity of a neighborhood. Average time spent on conspicuous leisure only 
  7increases as the individual stays in a neighborhood longer, and population turnover in that 
neighborhood falls.
2  
A. Endogenous mobility 
What are the main determinants of the average amount of time spent in a neighborhood? 
Here, we make the obvious point that population turnover depends negatively on the 
costs of moving, which means the average time spent in the neighborhood will increase 
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+, =− = >  which means that aggregate conspicuous 
consumption will go down as moving costs increase, whereas aggregate conspicuous 
leisure will go up as moving costs increase.  
Over recent decades, the cost of moving between cities has dropped substantially.
3 
Among of the factors that have driven this change are reduced physical transport costs 
due to faster and cheaper means of transportation; increased international transparency of 
educational qualifications (eg. the EU’s 1997 decision to adopt the Anglo-Saxon 
Bachelor-Masters university format); diminishing numbers of languages in common 
                                                 
2 This holds because the denominator has to be negative if the initial situation is to be a symmetric stable 
equilibrium. Whilst the model in principle does not rule out multiple symmetric equilibria, the signs of the 
comparative statics are unaffected by this possibility. 
  8parlance; fewer barriers to labor mobility within trading blocs; and increased 
harmonization of pension, tax, and company laws. Using the above model, the direction 
of materialistic values is predicted to co-move with the costs of mobility. According to 
our simple theory, factors such as falling prices of air travel in the US, harmonization of 
EU laws, and reduced barriers to internal migration in China should lead to rising 
materialistic values in the US, EU and China in the future. 
B. Possible further extension 
There are many ways in which one can extend the simple model above to fit various 
empirical phenomenon. The two main extensions one can think of concern the existence 
of initial wealth and a status-free consumption aspect.  
Adding existing wealth could be done by adding an individual constant Wi to wage 
earnings  . The effect of such a variable is very simple: greater initial wealth implies 
a lower marginal conspicuous consumption utility from an additional hour work. Hence a 
direct implication would be that those individuals with greater initial wealth would, 
ceteris paribus, invest relatively more time in conspicuous leisure. This concurs with 
another observation of Veblen: whilst Veblen made great play of the fact that royal courts 
and idle nobility spent a lot of their time on conspicuous leisure, he did not loose sight of 
the fact that they were also conspicuously rich. Veblen argued the poor were relatively 
more into conspicuous consumption, whilst the very rich were relatively more into 
it i hw
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Note however that the cost of moving within cities (ie. commuting) has not fallen, partly because the cost 
of delays rises with real incomes: Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003). 
  9conspicuous leisure, which is exactly what one would predict from our framework once 
one inserts initial wealth. Veblen recognized that the very rich were engaged in both 
conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption even though he called them ‘the 
leisure classes’.  
Adding status-free consumption could be done by adding a function c( ) to the utility 
function. Such a function would attempt to capture classic consumption benefits from 
income. If one chooses the functional form of this appropriately, it could rationalize why 
hours worked goes down when wages increase via a classic income effect. One would 
then have to start putting additional restrictions on the subfunctions of utility though 
because one would then have 3 functions depending on hours (c(.), u
it i hw
1(.) and u2(.)), which 
leads to possible multiple equilibria and indeterminacy if one puts no restrictions on 
them. 
 
Whilst these two additions are capable of fitting more stylized facts about status races, we 
feel they add no real additional insights to our parsimonious model which we thus prefer 
as the basis for looking at empirical evidence. 
III. Empirical application 
To evaluate our theory, we would ideally want data in which we could observe panel 
variation in individual time-use (i.e. a detailed list of how time during the day is spent), 
and observe how this time-allocation changes when population turnover causes changes 
in reference groups. Unfortunately, we know of no such dataset. We therefore proceed 
  10via a more indirect approach, in which observed work time is assumed to be positively 
correlated with an individual’s investment in conspicuous consumption, and negatively 
correlated with investment in conspicuous leisure. This allows us to use changes in 
aggregate work time as evidence of changes in conspicuous consumption and 
conspicuous leisure. 
 
To test our theory, we look at interstate mobility and work time in the United States. We 
use interstate mobility (rather than interstate plus intrastate mobility) on the basis that 
interstate mobility will almost always involve a change in one’s social circles. Local 
turnover is harder to interpret because there are many movements within cities and within 
states that do not imply a change in the reference group. If there is an externality in 
population turnover, it should be more clearly evident when looking at interstate mobility 
rates.  
 
Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (2003) note that in the immediate post-war decades, 
interstate mobility increased significantly – driven primarily by higher levels of 
educational attainment. Since mobility varies substantially over the life-cycle, it is 
necessary to compare across similar age groups. For example, focusing on the fraction of 
those aged 30-39 who had moved in the previous 5 years, this figure rose from 7.5 
percent in 1940 to 12.2 percent in 1970.  
Over recent decades, US interstate mobility rates have been relatively constant. 
Nonetheless, there has been considerable variation in mobility rates across states. 
Averaged over the period 1981-2003, the fraction of a state’s population who had arrived 
from another state during the past year ranged from 1.7 percent in Pennsylvania to 7.9 
  11percent in Nevada. Figure 1 shows a simple scatter plot of mobility rates against average 
hours worked per week. In the cross-section, there is a strong positive relationship 
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Figure 1: Migration Rate and Hours Worked, 1981-2003
 
However, the cross-sectional relationship is not necessarily indicative of a causal effect 
of population turnover on conspicuous leisure. To test our theory in a more robust 
manner, we instead look for variation within states over time. We use the March 
supplement to the Current Population Survey from 1981-2003, restricting our sample to 
those aged 16 and over. As our measure of mobility, we use a question that asked 
whether the respondent had changed residence in the previous 12 months (ie. since March 
1 of the previous year). Respondents were coded as having moved if they had moved 
from another state. As our variation is only across state-year cells, we can without loss of 
generality collapse the data to this level. This gives us 21 years of data, since the mobility 
  12question was not asked in 1985 and 1995. Across 50 states and the District of Columbia, 
the sample size is 1071. 
Our dependent variables are three measures of labor supply: the usual number of hours 
worked per week in the previous year; the number of weeks worked in the previous year; 
and the number of hours worked in the previous year (calculated by multiplying together 
the first two numbers). The universe for all three variables is those who worked at some 
point in the previous year. If conspicuous leisure is declining and conspicuous 
consumption is increasing, we should expect to see an increase in labor supply. For those 
working full-time, this is more likely to occur on the hours margin, while for those with a 
weaker attachment to the labor force, it is more likely to occur on the weeks worked 
margin. One factor to bear in mind is that if we only found an effect on weeks worked, 
we might worry that we were picking up a participation effect rather than a conspicuous 
leisure effect.  
Naturally, many factors apart from population turnover could affect labor supply. We 
therefore present all our specifications with state and year fixed effects. In addition, we 
control for several demographic factors that might affect labor supply: average age, 
average age squared, average years of education, fraction non-white, and fraction female. 
Furthermore, we include a set of controls intended to capture the effect of productivity 
shocks: the unemployment rate, the log of the population size in the current and previous 
year, the log of the average hourly wage, and the log of the average personal income per 
capita. With the exception of the hourly wage, our productivity variables are not drawn 
from the CPS. Per capita personal income is taken from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’s Annual State Personal Income series, while unemployment rates and 
  13population figures are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment 
figures. Note that by controlling for both the log of the population size and the log of the 
population size in the previous year, our specification also implicitly includes the 
population growth rate (the difference between the two). Thus if we find any significant 
population turnover effects, they will not be driven by state growth, but rather by the 
amount of ‘population churn’ in a state, controlling for the state’s size and growth rate.  
Because the mobility question provides the average mobility rate from the previous 
March to the current March, while the labor supply questions relate to the past calendar 
year (January to December), there is some question as to the appropriate lag structure. 
Clearly, labor supply decisions in January and February of the previous year cannot be 
affected by mobility in the period from March onwards. Furthermore, there will probably 
be some lag between changes in mobility and changes in labor supply. It may therefore 
be preferable to use the previous year’s mobility rate. Thus we present three 
specifications:  
•  the current period’s mobility rate, eg. the effect of mobility from March 2002 to 
March 2003 on labor supply from January 2002 to December 2002; 
•  the previous period’s mobility rate, eg. the effect of mobility from March 2001 to 
March 2002 on labor supply from January 2002 to December 2002; and 
•  the average mobility rate across the two periods, eg. the effect of mobility from 
March 2001 to March 2003 on labor supply from January 2002 to December 
2002. 
  14Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. In the case of the labor supply 
measures, average hours worked per week falls if we exclude migrants (those arriving in 
the past year), while average weeks per year rises if migrants are excluded. This suggests 
that migrants tend to work more hours per week, but fewer weeks per year. On net, 
migrants work fewer hours per year than non-migrants. Because one might reasonably 
worry that migrants themselves differ in unobserved ways from non-migrants, we will 
look at specifications both with and without migrants. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics     
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Migration rate  0.0401  0.017 
Hours per week  27.212  2.023 
Hours per week (excl migrants)  27.105  2.036 
Weeks per year  31.348  2.480 
Weeks per year (excl migrants)  31.424  2.501 
Hours per year  1248.739  107.418 
Hours per year (excl migrants)  1250.022  108.178 
Average age  42.921  1.637 
Fraction female  0.518  0.013 
Fraction non-white  0.145  0.138 
Average years of education  12.469  0.519 
Log personal income per capita  9.871  0.352 
Unemployment rate (percent)  6.000  2.147 
Log population  14.653  1.033 
Log average hourly wage  2.359  0.364 
Sources: 
1. Labor supply, migration, age, gender, race, education and hourly wage from March CPS, 1981-2003 
(excluding 1985 and 1995). Sample includes all respondents aged 16 and over, collapsed to the state-year 
cell level.  
2. Specifications excluding migrants omit those who had moved into the state during the previous 12 
months. 
3. Unemployment rate and population figures from Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
4. Personal income from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Our regression specification is as follows: 
1 ' ln( ) ln( ) sts t s t s t s t s t l Mob S pop pop f f s t α βγ δ − =+ + + + + + ε  
  15which relates labor supply in state s at time t to a measure of mobility, state 
characteristics, current and lagged population levels, state and time fixed effects, and an 
i.i.d. error term.  
Table 2 shows the results using the current period’s mobility rates. When both migrants 
and non-migrants are included, population turnover does not appear to have any 
significant effect on labor supply. However, when migrants are omitted, there is a 
significant positive relationship between population turnover and hours worked, such that 
a 1 percentage point rise in the interstate mobility rate in a year is associated with a 3 
minute rise in the average working week. This is quite telling: the non-migrants react to 
the arrival of migrants by working more hours per week, which in our theory is due to the 
fact that their leisure activities are suddenly less observable when the neighborhood is in 
flux. 
Table 3 uses the lagged migration rate instead of the current migration rate. This both 
allows for the possibility that it may take some time to change labor supply, and deals 
with the fact that mobility and labor supply imperfectly overlap in the data. In this 
specification, we find a significant positive relationship between population turnover and 
hours worked per week, whether or not migrants are excluded. When migrants are 
excluded, there is also a significant positive relationship between population turnover and 
hours worked per year, though this is only significant at the 10 percent level. We interpret 
this as a direct indication that the conspicuous leisure of non-migrants goes down soon 
after the arrival of new migrants. 
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Table 2: Labor Supply and the Current Migration Rate 
  Full sample Excl recent migrants












Migration rate  -5.449  3.039  -67.649  1.671  5.190**  178.924 
  [1.57] [1.11] [0.44] [0.47] [2.03] [1.16] 
Average age  1.682***  1.262***  87.575***  1.677***  1.254***  87.408*** 
  [4.74] [4.64] [5.62] [4.85] [4.89] [5.62] 
Average age
2 -0.023*** -0.018*** -1.112*** -0.023*** -0.018*** -1.107*** 
  [6.24] [6.11] [6.93] [6.42] [6.46] [6.95] 
Fraction female  -0.784  -3.686  -125.796  -1.878  -4.38  -184.384 
  [0.20] [1.20] [0.78] [0.49] [1.42] [1.14] 
Fraction nonwhite  -4.914**  -1.812  -103.898  -4.632**  -1.861  -109.53 
  [2.29] [0.98] [1.13] [2.06] [0.99] [1.16] 
Average years of education  0.908***  0.941***  42.369***  0.910***  0.925***  43.817*** 
  [3.46] [3.57] [3.45] [3.42] [3.60] [3.55] 
Log personal income  -0.602  1.577  51.723  -0.511  1.572  54.003 
  [0.28] [0.94] [0.50] [0.25] [1.05] [0.57] 
Unemployment  rate  -0.304***  -0.162*** -13.448*** -0.299***  -0.154*** -12.998*** 
  [6.48] [4.09] [6.31] [6.55] [4.02] [6.28] 
Log population  10.140**  7.727**  482.120**  10.711**  8.699**  528.539** 
  [2.14] [2.08] [2.26] [2.22] [2.35] [2.49] 
Log population t-1 -9.130** -7.529**  -426.433**  -9.945** -8.664**  -482.529** 
  [2.04] [2.19] [2.12] [2.18] [2.52] [2.40] 
Log average hourly wage  -0.543***  -0.586***  -24.266***  -0.520***  -0.567***  -23.462*** 
  [3.35] [4.18] [3.83] [3.31] [4.15] [3.58] 
State & year fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 
R-squared  0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 
Sources: As for Table 1 
Notes:  
1. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust t-
statistics, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. 
2. In specifications excluding recent migrants, the average demographic characteristics (age, fraction 




Our preferred specification is Table 4, which uses the average mobility rate in the current 
and lagged period, which (from a theoretical standpoint) seems most likely to affect labor 
supply. The averaging of mobility rates across two years also reduces the importance of 
measurement error. We again find a positive and significant relationship between 
migration and hours worked per week. The coefficient in this specification is higher, 
which may be due to the reduced effect of measurement error. When migrants are 
excluded, a 1 percentage point rise in the interstate mobility rate is associated with a 7 
  17minute rise in the average working week (significant at the 1 percent level), and a 3.8 
hour increase in the number of hours worked per year (significant at the 10 percent level). 
Table 3: Labor Supply and the Lagged Migration Rate 
  Full sample Excl recent migrants












Migration rate t-1 0.304 5.646**  113.77  2.396  8.490***  257.153* 
  [0.10] [2.17] [0.88] [0.73] [3.39] [1.88] 
Average age  1.550*** 1.270***  83.679***  1.616*** 1.344***  87.376*** 
  [4.36] [4.59] [5.40] [4.61] [5.11] [5.60] 
Average age
2 -0.021*** -0.018*** -1.068*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -1.100*** 
  [5.85] [5.96] [6.65] [6.14] [6.64] [6.90] 
Fraction female  -2.561 -5.653*  -196.894 -3.01  -6.045*  -231.278 
  [0.61] [1.73] [1.11] [0.67] [1.76] [1.25] 
Fraction nonwhite  -4.649* -2.143  -122.644  -4.861* -2.271  -126.513 
  [1.95] [1.11] [1.26] [1.91] [1.08] [1.18] 
Average years of education  0.701*** 0.783***  34.473***  0.868*** 0.828***  40.170*** 
  [2.60] [2.84] [2.72] [3.08] [2.98] [2.98] 
Log personal income  -1.416 0.689 14.12 -0.662 0.928 38.705 
  [0.61] [0.37] [0.13] [0.29] [0.56] [0.38] 
Unemployment rate  -0.306***  -0.166*** -13.329*** -0.301***  -0.164*** -12.998*** 
  [6.26] [3.77] [6.00] [6.22] [3.94] [5.89] 
Log population  9.372*  7.475* 487.296** 9.883*  7.675* 505.911** 
  [1.84] [1.87] [2.12] [1.93] [1.92] [2.25] 
Log population t-1 -8.688* -7.632**  -444.477**  -9.267* -7.779**  -464.393** 
  [1.83] [2.11] [2.07] [1.96] [2.16] [2.24] 
Log average hourly wage  -0.239 -0.372*  -15.083  -0.519***  -0.605***  -24.506*** 
  [0.93] [1.71] [1.57] [3.07] [3.96] [3.60] 
State & year fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1020 1020 1020  918  918  918 
R-squared  0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 
Sources and Notes: As for Table 2 
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Table 4: Labor Supply and the Average Migration Rate (Current and Lagged) 
  Full sample Excl recent migrants












(Migration rate+  -3.628 9.915**  140.952 3.211  12.190***  386.638* 
 Migration rate t-1)/2  [0.71] [2.32] [0.64] [0.63] [3.31] [1.81] 
Average age  1.629***  1.347***  87.273***  1.608***  1.315***  86.430*** 
  [4.47] [4.84] [5.46] [4.55] [4.88] [5.41] 
Average age
2 -0.022*** -0.019*** -1.099*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -1.091*** 
  [5.88] [6.24] [6.67] [6.07] [6.40] [6.68] 
Fraction female  -2.004  -4.978  -160.925  -2.894  -5.604  -217.283 
  [0.45] [1.47] [0.89] [0.64] [1.64] [1.18] 
Fraction nonwhite  -5.042**  -2.091  -115.157  -4.874*  -2.357  -129.987 
  [2.14] [1.06] [1.12] [1.96] [1.15] [1.24] 
Average years of education  0.917***  0.877***  41.170***  0.872***  0.840***  40.436*** 
  [3.24] [3.14] [3.10] [3.06] [3.00] [2.96] 
Log personal income  -0.823  0.755  29.875  -0.728  0.638  28.668 
  [0.35] [0.41] [0.27] [0.32] [0.38] [0.28] 
Unemployment  rate  -0.304***  -0.170*** -13.317*** -0.301***  -0.163*** -12.977*** 
  [6.15] [4.02] [5.95] [6.24] [3.97] [5.91] 
Log population  8.875*  5.524  412.937*  9.646*  6.661*  471.505** 
  [1.80] [1.38] [1.83] [1.90] [1.66] [2.11] 
Log population t-1 -7.965* -5.428  -359.598*  -9.025*  -6.741*  -429.116** 
  [1.73] [1.49] [1.73] [1.92] [1.86] [2.08] 
Log average hourly wage  -0.523***  -0.604***  -24.383***  -0.513***  -0.587***  -23.956*** 
  [3.08] [3.88] [3.77] [3.10] [3.88] [3.58] 
State & year fixed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  918 918 918 918 918 918 
R-squared  0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 





This short paper has put forward a very simple economic theory of the increase of 
materialism, understood as greater relative investments in conspicuous consumption, 
ultimately driven by lower costs of mobility. This may also shed light on the question of 
why the working patterns of Americans and Europeans have diverged over recent 
decades. From 1970-2002, the numbers of hours worked per year in European Union fell 
  19by 13, and grew by 20 in the US (OECD 2004).
4 One possible reason for this divergence 
could be that Europe has lower rates of internal migration than the US, largely due to 
linguistic barriers between countries. High population turnover rates in the US might 
have helped to make Americans more materialistic than Europeans. If policymakers 
wished to rectify this, the clear remedy would be to tax mobility because of the negative 
externality that population turnover imposes on the visibility of the leisure of those that 
stay behind. 
 
There are many reasons to think that the increase in population turnover over recent years 
is on balance a positive development. In highly mobile societies such as the US, people 
can move from declining industrial cities to cities with better weather and amenities 
(Glaeser and Kohlhase 2003), workers can relocate from high-unemployment regions to 
low-unemployment regions, and citizens can choose neighborhoods with their preferred 
level of public goods provision (Tiebout 1956).
5 Yet it is nonetheless important to 
recognize that higher rates of population turnover impose a cost on others, by requiring 
over-investment in conspicuous consumption, and under-investment in conspicuous 
leisure.  
                                                 
4 This figure is the total number of hours divided by the total population, and thus captures both 
participation effects, and the hours worked by those in the workforce. The figure for the European Union is 
for the EU-15 (excluding the ten recent entrants). 
5 Cushing-Daniels (2004) finds that while labor market differences have a significant impact on migration 
patterns, welfare generosity does not. 
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